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BREACH OF WARRANTY-RIGHTS AND
OBLIGATIONS
D. MICHAEL CASE*
T HIS ARTICLE examines the breach of warranty endorse-
ment of an aircraft insurance policy and the respective
rights and obligations of the parties to the policy, focusing on
the most troublesome subjects and the most frequently arising
controversies. For purposes of this study, "BOW" refers to the
breach of warranty or lienholder's single interest endorse-
ment, because the terms are generally used synonymously.'
The elements of the BOW itself must be explored, however,
before the rights and obligations of the parties are examined.
Generally two types of insurance clauses are used to protect
the interest of the mortgagee: (1) the "loss payable" or "ordi-
nary mortgage clause"; and (2) the "standard" or "union
mortgage clause". A mortgagee claiming under a loss payable
clause or ordinary mortgage clause is nothing more than an
assignee, and his rights are subject to all defenses that the in-
surer may have against the mortgagor." The standard mort-
gage clause or union mortgage clause, on the other hand, pro-
vides that the mortgagee is protected against a loss resulting
* Corporate Counsel, Cessna Finance Corporation. B.A., 1966, Southwestern Col-
lege; J.D., 1972, Washburn University of Topeka. Mr. Case is a member of the Kansas
Bar, the current President of the Aircraft Finance Association, and 1980 President of
the Wichita Corporate Counsel Society.
Some state insurance commissioners, for example, those in Kansas, have deter-
mined that there is no breach of warranty endorsement, and consequently it is
termed a lienholder's single interest endorsement.
S ANDERSON, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 42:671 (1962) [hereinafter cited as ANDERSON];
5A APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 3402 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
APPLEMAN].
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from any act or neglect by the mortgagor and that an act or
neglect by the mortgagor shall not defeat the insurance cover-
age as to the mortgagee.3
The BOW attached to an aircraft insurance policy is tradi-
tionally a standard mortgage clause and has been patterned
after the New York Standard Mortgage Clause.4 The New
York Standard Mortgage Clause was developed and used in
ANDERSON, supra note 2, § 42:682-719; APPLEMAN, supra note 2, § 4164.
See N.Y. INS. LAW § 168 (McKinney 1966). The New York Standard Mortgage
Clause states:
loss, if any, under this policy, shall be payable to the aforesaid as
mortgagee (or trustee) as interests may appear under all present or
future mortgages upon the property herein described in which the
aforesaid may have an interest as mortgagee (or trustee), in order of
precedence of said mortgages, and this insurance, as to the interests of
the mortgagee (or trustee) only therein, shall not be invalidated by any
act or neglect of the mortgagor or owner of the within described policy,
nor by any foreclosure or other proceedings or notice of sale relating to
the property, nor by any change in the title or ownership of the prop-
erty, nor by the occupation of the premises for purposes more hazard-
ous than are permitted by this policy; provided, that in case the mort-
gagor or owner shall neglect to pay any premium due under this policy,
the mortgagee (or trustee) shall, on demand, pay the same.
Provided, also, that the mortgagee (or trustee) shall notify this com-
pany of any change of ownership or occupancy or increase of hazard
which shall come to the knowledge of said mortgagee (or trustee) and,
unless permitted by this policy, it shall be noted thereon and the
mortgagee (or trustee) shall, on demand, pay the premium for such
increased hazard for the term of the use thereof; otherwise this policy
shall be null and void.
This company reserves the right to cancel this policy at any time as
provided by its terms, but in such case this policy shall continue in
force for the benefit only of the mortgagee (or trustee) for ten days
after notice to the mortgagee (or trustee) of such cancellation and shall
then cease, and this company shall have the right, on like notice, to
cancel this agreement.
Whenever this company shall pay the mortgagee (or trustee) any
sum for loss under this policy and shall claim that, as to the mortgagor
or owner, no liability therefore existed, this company shall, to the ex-
tent of such payment, be thereupon legally subrogated to all the rights
of the party to whom such payment shall be made, under all securities
held as collateral to the mortgage debt, or may, at its option, pay to
the mortgagee (or trustee) the whole principal due Or to grow due on
the mortgage with interest, and shall thereupon receive a full assign-
ment and transfer of the mortgage and of all such other security; but
no subrogation shall impair the right of the mortgagee (or trustee) to
recover the full amount of said mortgagee's (or trustee's) claim.
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connection with fire insurance policies for real estate. Unlike
real estate, aircraft are highly mobile, and aircraft and pilots
must be certified or licensed under applicable provisions of
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.1 Therefore, the standard
mortgage clause has been modified for aircraft and, although
specific clauses vary, a typical clause provides:
This endorsement extends your coverage under part 2-Air-
craft Physical Damage-to protect the interests of the
lienholder shown below, even if coverage is otherwise invali-
dated by any act or neglect.
1. Aircraft Description, lienholder and loan balance. [Identi-
fication of aircraft].
2. Adjustment in Payment.
Aircraft physical damage under Coverage F or G will be ad-
justed with you and payment will be made to you and the
lienholder shown above for the damaged aircraft.
3. Payment to lienholder only.
We will pay the valid claim of the lienholder of the aircraft
shown in Paragraph 1 above if: (a) there would otherwise be
coverage for the claim except for any act or neglect resulting in
our denial of payment to you; and (b) the lienholder (1) has
notified us of any change in ownership or substantial change in
risk of which the lienholder was aware; (2) pays any premium
due under this policy on demand if you have neglected to pay
the premium; and (3) gives us a sworn proof of loss within 90
days after receiving notice from us of your failure to do so.
4. What we will pay.
Under paragragh 3 above, we will pay the lienholder the
lesser of the following: (a) the unpaid balance of the lien on the
aircraft, less unearned interest and unpaid installments more
than 30 days overdue on the date of the loss or damage; or (b)
the amount shown under "loan balance" in Paragraph 1 above;
or (c) 90% of the agreed value of the aircraft.
5. When we will pay.
Under paragraph 3 above, we will pay the lienholder within
30 days after: (a) the lienholder has used all reasonable means
to collect the amounts due from you; and (b) you have given us
a sworn proof of loss statement or the lienholder has done so
6 49 U.S.C. § 1422-1423 (1981).
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within 90 days after receiving notice from us of your failure to
do so.
6. Our right of recovery.
If we pay the lienholder for any claim and deny payment to
you because of any act or neglect that invalidates your cover-
age: (a) we will take over the rights granted under the promis-
sory note, mortgage, lien or contract to the lienholder against
you and in and to all the property held as security for the loan
to the extent of our payment; or at our option, we may pay the
lienholder the whole amount due or to become due from you
with interest and take a full assignment and transfer of all of
the rights of the lienholder against you and of all property held
as security for the loan; and (b) you must pay us back in full
for the payment we make.
7. What we will not pay.
We will not pay any claim by anyone if you or anyone you
permit to fly your aircraft embezzles, converts or secretes the
aircraft or if there has been a change in title or ownership.
8. Legal action against us.
No legal action shall be brought against us under this en-
dorsement until its provisions have been complied with fully.
9. Cancellation notice to lienholder.
If we cancel your aircraft physical damage coverage, we will
send 30 days prior written notice to the lienholder at the ad-
dress shown in this endorsement.'
Three separate entities, each assuming several roles, are af-
fected by the BOW. For simplicity, throughout this paper the
named insured, mortgagor or borrower will be referred to as
the "mortgagor." The creditor, lender, or mortgagee will be
referred to as the "mortgagee," and the insurance company
will be referred to as the "insurer". In all instances the air-
craft insurance policy containing a BOW creates a three-party
relationship between the insurer, mortgagor and mortgagee.
The law is well settled throughout the country that the BOW
creates and constitutes a separate insurance policy between
4 Lienholders interest endorsement, Aviation Office of America (Form No. 2235-
79). Plain English-The Plain English form is presented because many states now
require that policies of insurance be written in that form. Standard Fire Policies,
FiRE & CASUALTY CAS. (CCH) V 2001-2106 (1982).
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the lienholder and the insurer.'
The important feature of the BOW is that the underlying
policy terms are not nullified, but a new and separate contract
is made between the insurer and the mortgagee.8 Neither the
mortgagor's contract nor the mortgagor's acts bind the mort-
gagee. Therefore, the mortgagee is not in the precarious posi-
tion of having his coverage destroyed by the ignorance, care-
lessness or negligence of the mortgagor.
Because the BOW is a separate contract of insurance, an
additional premium may be charged for the coverage. The
payment of an additional premium illustrates that the BOW's
affect on the mortgagee's status is substantially greater than
simply making him an additional named insured under a loss
payable clause. This is further illustrated by the fact that the
mortgagor and mortgagee are kept separate throughout the
BOW.'
The BOW is almost always written in a stated or agreed
value basis rather than on an actual cash value basis.' 0 The
recovery of the mortgagee is typically limited to eighty or
Piedmont Fire Ins. Co. of Ala. v. Fidelity Mortgage Co., 250 Ala. 609, 35 So. 2d
352 (1948); American Mercury Ins. Co. v. Inland-Western Fin. Co., 6 Ariz. App. 409,
433 P.2d 60 (1967); National Casualty Funding Corp. v. Motors Ins. Corp., 59 Cal. 2d
91, 387 P.2d 361, 28 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1963); Glenn Falls Ins. Co. v. Porter, 44 Fla. 568,
33 So. 473 (1902); Security Ins. Co. v. Commercial Credit Equip., 399 So. 2d 31 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1981); AirVac, Inc. v. Ranger Ins. Co., 266 So. 178 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1972); Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Charles S. Martin Distrib. Co., 120 Ga. App. 133,
169 S.E.2d 695 (1969); Fred v. Pacific Indem. Co., 53 Hawaii 384, 494 P.2d 783 (1972);
Guardian Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Ranger Ins. Co., 2 Il1. App. 3d 77, 267 N.E.2d 109
(1971); Cessna Fin. Corp. v. Ranger Ins. Co., 15 Av. Cas. 17,309 (D. Kan. 1979); Hart-
ford Fire Ins. Co. v. Associates Capital Corp., 313 So. 2d 404 (Miss. 1975); AVEMCO
Ins. Co. v. Jefferson Bank & Trust Co., 16 Av. Cas. 17,242 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); Na-
tional Factors, Inc. v. Waters, 42 Misc. 2d 822, 249 N.Y.S.2d 121 (Sup. Ct. 1964);
Western Leasing, Inc. v. Occidental Fire & Cas. Co. of N.C., 268 Or. 426, 521 P.2d 352
(1974); Osborne v. Pacific Ins. Co. of N.Y., 91 R.I. 469, 165 A.2d 725 (1960); St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Kretachfield, 163 Tex. 586, 350 S.W.2d 534 (1961); Bennett
Motor Co. v. Lyon, 14 Utah 2d 161, 380 P.2d 69 (1963). ANDERSON, supra note 2, §
42:694; Appleman, supra note 2, § 3401.
8 ANDERSON, supra, note 2 § 42:671; Appleman, supra note 2, § 3402.
Standard Fire Policies, FiRE & CASUALTY CAS. (CCH) T 2001-2106 (1982).
10 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. See also United States Aviation Un-
derwriters, Inc. (Form 369-AZ REV 10-79); Southeastern Aviation Underwriters, Inc.
AV-19 (1-80); Associated American Underwriters, Inc. (Form AAU-4: London Form
AV-28); AVEMCO Insurance Company Form ERPE 3 (1-81); and National Aviation
Underwriters Form PLL 749 (12-80).
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ninety per cent of the agreed value of the aircraft or the loan
balance remaining, less unpaid installments past due thirty
days or more, whichever is less.11
The BOW imposes several particular obligations on the
mortgagee. The mortgagee is required to pay premiums if the
mortgagor fails to pay them,1" and the mortgagee must notify
the insurer of any known increase in hazard or change in title
or ownership. 3 The mortgagee is charged with the responsi-
bility to render proof of loss if the mortgagor fails to do so,1'
and upon payment, to assign to the insurer all rights under
the underlying promissory note or security agreement to the
extent of such payment.15 All of these obligations create
unique problems which will be discussed later in this article.
When considering some of the specific problem areas of the
aircraft BOW, one major caveat should never be forgotten:
there are as many BOW forms as there are aviation managers
and insurance companies," therefore the particular policy in-
volved must always be examined in great detail. While there
are striking similarities in the various policy forms, they are
by no means identical, as the following chart indicates:





16 See, e.g., Avemco Insurance Company, National Aviation Underwriters, Inc.,
Aero Coverages, Inc., Aero Space Managers, Inc., American Aviation Underwriters,
American National General Agencies, Associated Aviation Underwriters, Aviation Of-
fice of America, Inc., Bristol Aviation, C.T.H. Aviation Underwriters, Crump Aviation
Underwriters, Eastern Aviation/Marine Underwriters, Insurance Company of North
America, Pacific Aviation Managers, Southern Marine/Aviation Underwriters, Inc.,
Southeastern Aviation Underwriters, Inc., Universal Aviation Underwriters, and
United States Aircraft Insurance Group, to name but a few.
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ASSOCIATED GOLDEN WING YES NO NM YES YES YES YES YES YES
AEROSPACE AV. UWRTRS. AMBIG NO NM YES YES YES YES YES YES
AMERICAN AV. UWRTRS. NM YES NM YES YES NM YES YES YES
YES
AOA AIR PLAIN NO NO NM YES YES YES YES YES
___ ___ __ 
__ ___ __90DI
C.T.H. UNDERWRITERS NO NO NM YES YES YES YES NC NO
CRUMP MONARCH INS CO. NO NO NM YES YES YES YES NC YES
EASTERN AV. UWRTRS. YES NO NM NM YES YES YES YES YES
GLOBAL AV. UWRTRS. NO NO NM YES YES YES YES NC NO
I.N.A. AERO PAC YES NO NM NM YES NM YES YES YES
LLOYD'S, LONDON AV28 YES NO NM NM YES YES YES NC NO
SOUTHEASTERN AV. UWR. YES NO NO YES YES NM YES YES YES
SOUTHERN MARINE & AV. YES NO NM NM YES YES YES NC YES
U.S.A.I.G. 360 POLICY YES NO NM NM YES YES YES YES YES
U.S.A.I.G. ALL CLEAR YES NO NM NM YES YES NO NO YES
NM = NOT MENTIONED
NC CHANGE OF TITLE OR OWNERSHIP NOT COVERED
17 D. McKensie, A Comparative Analysis of Breach of Warranty, (unpublished
manuscript) (printed with permission of author). While the chart is several years old
and some of the policy forms have been changed, it still illustrates that there are
differences in the BOW policy forms.
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Some of the policy forms are affected by a "change in title
or ownership" while others are not; most, but not all, require
the mortgagee to notify the insurer of an increase in hazard;
all require the insurer to advise the mortgagee if the policy is
cancelled by the insurer; all of the various policy forms are
silent as to whether the insurer is responsible for advising the
mortgagee in the event the mortgagor cancels the policy; and
all the policy forms provide exclusionary language for a con-
version, embezzlement or secretion by the named insured, al-
though many are silent as to what happens if persons other
than the named insured convert, embezzle or secrete the
aircraft.
It goes without saying that, where there is no conflict be-
tween the BOW and the main policy terms, conditions and
exclusions, coverage issues can be resolved rather easily. For
instance, assume the mortg is a Visual Flight Rules
(VFR) pilot, yet he takes off in nstrument Flight Rules (IFR)
conditions. A crash ensues and the aircraft is totally de-
stroyed. Further assume salvage is readily available and the
mortgagee is able to peacefully repossess the salvage, as well
as provide to the insurer a full assignment of his underlying
loan and security documents. In such circumstances, the in-
surer may deny coverage under the mortgagor's policy, based
upon pilot qualifications, while at the same time the insurer
may accept coverage under the BOW.
Not all BOW losses are as simple as the hypothetical situa-
tion described. Additional factors that cloud the situation in-
clude: (1) fraud in the procurement of the mortgagor's policy;
(2) damage to the aircraft outside the territorial limits of the
main policy; (3) confiscation of the aircraft; (4) disappearance
of the aircraft; (5) failure of the mortgagee to gain peaceful
possession of the aircraft; or (6) partial loss of the aircraft
only. When the additional factors are present, the insurer will
argue that the BOW is a "following form" policy, requiring
consideration of the underlying terms and conditions of the
main policy in determining coverage under the BOW. At the
same time, the mortgagee is likely to contend that the BOW is
a separate policy, providing coverage in all instances where
[47.
BREACH OF WARRANTY
the mortgagor breaches his obligations. The mortgagee will al-
lege further that the only exclusions from coverage are for
conversion, embezzlement or secretion of the property. These
exclusions are found in virtually all policy forms, but with
some distinctions as to whether the exclusions apply only to
the mortgagor or to one in lawful possession of the aircraft.
FRAUD AND MISREPRESENTATION
Because the BOW is a separate contract and provides that
the mortgagee's interest shall not be invalidated by any act or
neglect of the mortgagor, the mortgagee's coverage is, as a
general rule, unaffected by a false statement made by the
mortgagor that could render the mortgagor's insurance void
ab initio.15 Thus, the mortgagee's coverage will not be invali-
dated by the mortgagor's misrepresentations concerning use
of the aircraft, pilot certification, and ownership of the air-
craft, even though the policy is void as to the mortgagor.
Coverage under the BOW should also be valid as to the
mortgagee, even though the mortgagor did not have an insura-
ble interest in the aircraft. Application of the decision in a
Florida case, AirVac v. Ranger Insurance Co.," would invali-
date a mortgagee's coverage if the mortgagor lacked an insura-
ble interest. The AirVac court relied in part on Western As-
surance Co. v. Hughes,S" a 1937 Oklahoma decision.
Unfortunately, the Florida court that decided AirVac ne-
glected more recent Oklahoma decisions, such as Great Amer-
ican Insurance Co. v. Southwestern Financial Co."1 and
Oklahoma State Union v. Folsom22 in which the Oklahoma
"8 Syndicate Ins. Co. v. Bohn, 65 F. 165 (8th Cir. 1894); AirVac, Inc. v. Ranger Ins.
Co., 266 So. 2d 178 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Vormelker v. Oleksinski, 199 N.W.2d
287 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972); Bacot v. Phenix Ins. Co., 96 Miss. 223, 50 So. 729 (1909);
Oklahoma State Union v. Folsom, 325 P.2d 1053 (Okla. 1958); Great Am. Ins. Co. v.
Southwestern Fin. Co., 297 P.2d 403 (1956); Western Assurance Co. v. Hughes, 179
Okla. 1254, 66 P.2d 1056 (1937); National Fire Ins. Co. v. Dallas Joint Stock Land
Bank, 174 Okla. 1596, 50 P.2d 326 (1935); Old Colony Coop. Bank v. Nationwide
Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 332 A.2d 434 (R.I. 1975). See ANDERSON, supra note 2, § 42:704.
266 So. 2d 178 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
179 Okla. 1254, 66 P.2d 1056 (1937).
297 P.2d 403 (Okla. 1956).
22 325 P.2d 1053 (Okla. 1958).
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Supreme Court rejected the insurable interest argument and
relied solely upon the fact that the BOW was an independent
contract.28 The importance of the insurable interest argument
in AirVac, however, must not be discounted because the inde-
pendent contract concept is cogently explained. The Florida
court states that the BOW is:
a clause which creates a new contract, creating a relationship of
insurer and insured between the insurer and lienholder, so that
the policy is not subject to forfeiture because of any act or
omission of the mortgagor, whether before or after the issuance
of the policy.2'
Although the fraudulent acts of the mortgagor may not in-
validate coverage as to the mortgagee under the BOW, the
mortgagee is protected only if he acts in good faith and does
not participate in the fraud or misrepresentation.2 Consistent
with such an approach, in Citizens State Bank v. American
Fire & Casualty Co." and Weekly v. Missouri Property In-
surance Placement,2 7 the courts held against a mortgagee
under a BOW, when the mortgagee became aware of the mort-
gagor's misrepresentation and failed to notify the insurer.
CONVERSION, EMBEZZLEMENT OR SECRETION
Without exception, if the mortgagee converts, embezzles or
secretes the mortgaged property, coverage under the BOW is
specifically excluded.2 Whether these same acts by someone
who is lawfully in possession, other than the mortgagee, ex-
clude coverage under the BOW, depends upon the specific
policy form involved.2 9 The key issue regarding coverage as to
the mortgagee under the BOW, however, may be: what consti-
tutes an act of conversion, embezzlement or secretion?
23 325 P.2d at 1056; Great American Ins. Co. v. Southwestern Fin. Co., 297 P.2d at
404.
, 266 So. 2d at 179.
" Id. at 180-81.
" 198 F.2d 57 (5th Cir. 1952).
7 538 S.W.2d 375 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
S See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
" See supra text accompanying note 17.
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In Commerce Union Bank v. Midland National Insurance
Co.,30 for example, an action was brought by the mortgagee for
a loss sustained as a result of a fire. The insurer denied cover-
age on the ground that the fire was deliberately set by the
mortgagor and therefore a "conversion" caused the loss.$' The
court agreed with the insurer that the intentional destruction
of the property by the mortgagor amounted to a conversion,
and therefore coverage was denied.2
In National Casualty Co. v. General Motors Acceptance
Corp.,83 the mortgagor brought an action under a BOW for
the loss of an automobile resulting from the mortgagor inten-
tionally running the automobile off a bridge and into a bay.
The insurer argued that the mortgagor, in intentionally run-
ning the automobile off the bridge, had converted the mortga-
gee's interest and therefore was excluded from coverage.'" The
court described the insurer's argument as "novel," but re-
jected it, holding that the insurer, by using the word "conver-
sion" in connection with the words "embezzlement and secre-
tion" in the BOW, referred to conversion in the criminal sense
rather than as a tort.3 5 The court reasoned that the owner's
intent in destroying the automobile was to cover up his own
disappearance by creating the impression that he had an acci-
dent, and not to convert the mortgagee's interest. As a result,
there was no conversion by the mortgagor within the meaning
of the policy exclusion."
National Casualty 7 illustrates that "conversion" is not de-
fined by the policy and is subject to differing interpretations.
Consequently, the interpretation most favorable to recovery
should be utilized. National Casualty, therefore, is more per-
suasive authority than the Commerce Union Bank case.
80 43 Ill. App. 2d 332, 193 N.E.2d 230 (1963).
* a' 193 N.E.2d at 231.
82 Id. at 232.
" 161 So. 2d 848 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
" Id. at 852.
u Id.
" Id.
87 161 So. 2d 848 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
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REPOSSESSION
Frequently, as a precondition to payment under the BOW,
the insurer requires the mortgagee to repossess a damaged air-
craft, and furnish a repossession certificate and bill of sale.
This prerequisite is based upon the policy conditions regard-
ing assistance and cooperation in subrogation, and the lan-
guage in the BOW which provides that upon payment the in-
surer is entitled to "an assignment and transfer of all the
rights . . . in and to the property." As previously discussed,
however, the BOW is recognized as a separate policy between
the insurer and the mortgagee, with its terms controlling the
respective rights of the parties.3 8 The BOW does not require
the mortgagee to repossess; it only requires the mortgagee to
transfer his interests in the property.39 Transferring an inter-
est in property does not require the transferor to have posses-
sion of the property at the time of transfer. Therefore, the
attempt by the insurer to require repossession as a prerequi-
site to payment under the BOW will be ineffective.
Another question arising from the BOW is whether cover-
age terminates or continues upon the mortgagee's reposses-
sion. In Fayette Bank & Trust v. Ranger Insurance Co.,40 the
court held that coverage remained intact and that a loss oc-
curring during the repossession was covered because the re-
possession itself did not constitute a change in title or owner-
ship in the aircraft. 41 The coverage continued although the
aircraft was flown under a ferry permit when the airworthi-
ness certificate had expired, a situation that would have
voided the mortgagor's coverage.4' The court's decision is
questionable though, considering the fact that acts which
could have voided coverage were committed by the mortgagee
or its agent, not the mortgagor. Consequently, it is arguable
" See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
89 Cessna Fin. Corp. v. Ranger Ins. Co., 15 Av. Cas. 17,309 (D. Kan. 1979); National
Community Bank of N.J. v. Aviation Office of Am., Inc., No. 349609, slip op. (N.J.
Bergen County Dist. Ct.) (order granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment).
40 12 Av. Cas. 17,887 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1972).
4. Id. at 17,888-89.
41 Id. at 17,889.
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that the court should have found no coverage, despite the fact
that under the main policy and the BOW, coverage was not
automatically terminated upon repossession of the aircraft.
PREMIUM PAYMENT BY MORTGAGEE
Most BOW policy forms provide that "in case the lessee,
mortgagor or owner shall neglect to pay any premium due
under such policy, the lienholder shall, on demand, pay the
same." The key question regarding this language is whether
the mortgagee's obligation to pay the premium is a "cove-
nant" or a "condition." If the obligation is a covenant, the
mortgagee has an absolute obligation to pay the premium. If
the obligation is a condition, the mortgagee need only pay the
premium to continue coverage. Most courts have held that the
requirement that the mortgagee pay premiums is a condition
and have required the mortgagee to pay the premium only if
the mortgagee desires to keep the insurance in force.48 The
minority rule holds that the mortgagee's obligation to pay
past-due premiums is a covenant."
Another question regarding premium payment involves the
rather common situation in which the insurance agent ad-
vances or finances the premium payment for the mortgagor.
In this situation, not only must the insurance agent overcome
the majority rule, he must also overcome the additional prob-
lem of being a mere volunteer. In either instance, he is not
entitled to recover premiums which have been advanced. 4"
Policy forms have differing language regarding the mortga-
43 See, e.g., Lupke-Rice Ass'n v. Cessna Fin. Corp., S76-628, slip op. (Ind. Allen
County Super. Ct. Sept. 26, 1979) (order granting defendant's motion for summary
judgment); General Credit Corp. v. Imperial Casualty & Indem., 167 Neb. 833, 95
N.W.2d 145 (1959); Whitehead v. Wilson Knitting Mills, 194 N.C. 281, 139 S.E. 456
(1927); Johnson, Sansom & Co. v. Fort Worth State Bank, 244 S.W. 657 (Tex. Civ.
App. - El Paso 1922, no writ).
4' Stoddart v. Black, 134 Kan. 838, 8 P.2d 305 (1932); Boston Safe Deposit & Trust
Co. v. Thomas, 59 Kan. 470, 53 P. 472 (1898); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
Upton, 2 N.D. 229, 50 N.W. 702 (1891). It is interesting to note that in Stoddart, the
Kansas court relied heavily on Asher v. Union Ins. Soc., 177 Ga. 662, 170 S.E. 786
(1933), which was overruled on review.
45 See Lupke-Rice Ass'n v. Cessna Fin. Corp., No. 526-62B (Ind. Super. Ct. 1979);
ANDMRSON supra note 2, § 31:152-165. See Annot. 56 A.L.R. 679 (1928).
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gee's obligation to pay past-due premiums. Some policies spe-
cifically state that the obligation is dependent upon the de-
mand of the "company." Certainly when the agent advances
the premium, he has very little to rely upon under this policy
form, because he is not the "company." '46
CONFISCATION OR SEIZURE
In a recent case, Lakewood Bank & Trust Co. v. Security
Insurance Co. of Hartford,47 an aircraft was delivered to a
third party for the purpose of a sales demonstration. Without
the knowledge or consent of the owner, the aircraft was flown
to Peru and confiscated.48 The insurer denied coverage to the
mortgagor and to the mortgagee based upon the underlying
policy exclusion which stated that no coverage is afforded
with respect to physical damage: "to a loss or damage due to
conversion, embezzlement or secretion by any person in pos-
session of the aircraft. . . nor for any loss or damage during
or resulting therefrom . . . . 4 The mortgagee argued that
the above provision was inconsistent with the BOW, which
provided that: "the insurance afforded by the policy shall not
be invalidated as regards the interests of the lienholder by
any act or neglect of the insured . . . ,, 0 The court found
that the aircraft was converted by the third party while it was
in his possession under a bailment, and that there was no am-
biguity between the underlying policy and the BOW. In-
stead, the court found that the clear language of the BOW
continues protection where, "but for" the mortgagor's action,
the policy would have provided coverage, and does not create
protection in a situation where "but for" the mortgagor's ac-
tion, there would have been no loss.5a It is important to recog-
4 Exceptions are AVEMCO Insurance Company and National Aviation
Underwriters.
47 1982 FiRi & CASUALTY CAS. 414 (CCH) (N.D. Tex. 1981).
48 Id. at 415.
4. Id. at 416.
oo Id.
I1 /d.
' Id. at 417. See also General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Ins. Co. of Pennsylvania, 16 Av.
Cas. 17,743 (N.D. Tex. 1980); AVEMCO Ins. Co. v. Jefferson Bank & Trust Co., 16
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nize, however, that the main policy and the BOW contained
exclusionary language relative to "conversions." Consequently,
once there is a finding that the aircraft has been converted,
there is no coverage under either policy for the loss.
In Security Insurance Co. of Hartford v. Commercial
Credit Equipment Corp.53 and American National Bank &
Trust Co. v. Young," a different result was reached. Security
involved an aircraft flown to Colombia by the mortgagor's pi-
lot and detained there by the Colombian government. The in-
surer denied coverage to the mortgagor and mortgagee, and
maintained that the policy insured direct physical loss and
disappearance or damage to the aircraft, and did not insure
against detention by a governmental authority." The insurer
also relied upon the policy exclusions relating to war, insurrec-
tion and the like. 6 The mortgagee relied upon the BOW lan-
guage which provided that the insurance shall not be invali-
dated as to the mortgagee by any act or neglect of the
mortgagor.57 The court found that the BOW created a sepa-
Av. Cas. 17,242 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
" 399 So. 2d. 31 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Young, No. 438983, slip op. (Minn. Ramsey
County Dist. Ct. Jan. 28, 1982).
" 399 So. 2d at 32.
" Id. at 33. The policy in Security provided:
Exclusions. This policy does not apply and no coverage is afforded:
... 6. To any loss, or damage or legal liability directly or indirectly
occasioned by, happening through or in consequence of war, invasion,
acts of foreign enemies, hostilities (whether war be declared or not),
civil war, rebellion, revolution, insurrection, military or usurped power
or confiscation or nationalization or requisition or destruction of or
damage to property by or under the order of any government or public
or local authority .... 17. To any loss or damage arising from war,
invasion, civil war, revolution, rebellion, insurrection or warlike [sic]
operations, whether there be a declaration or war or not, or capture,
seizure, arrest, restraint, or detention, or the consequences thereof or
of any attempt thereat, or any taking of the property insured, or dam-
age to or destruction thereof, by any government or governmental au-
thority or agent, whether secret or otherwise or by any military, naval
or usurped power, whether any of the foregoing be done by way of
confiscation, requisition or otherwise and whether in time of peace or
war, and whether lawful or unlawful.
Id.
Id. The policy in Security provided:
This insurance as to the interest of the said lienholder shall not be
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rate and distinct contract between the mortgagee and insurer
and contained its own exclusions. The court held that, when
the exclusions in a policy conflict with the specific provisions
of the BOW, the language in the BOW prevails.56
In American National Bank, under a similar set of circum-
stances, the insurer argued that the seizure of the aircraft was
specifically excluded from coverage by the main policy exclu-
sions which provided that:
This policy does not apply ... (h) Under Coverages A, B, and
C, to occurrences, accidents or losses (1) during or in connec-
tion with a flight involving trafficing [sic] in narcotics, drugs or
hallucinogens. . ., or (2) due to (a) capture, seizure. . ., or the
consequences thereof or any attempt thereat, or any taking of
the aircraft or any loss or damage thereof by any government
or governmental authority or agent .... 59
and further that the BOW itself contained a "savings clause"
(my language, not that of the insurer) that stated:
Nothing herein contained shall be held to vary, waive, alter or
extend any of the terms, conditions, agreements, or warranties
of the below mentioned policy, other than as above stated.60
The court, in its decision, reviewed the fundamental rules of
construction for interpreting an insurance contract and pro-
vided a brief history of the standard mortgage clause. Based
on its analysis, the court found coverage for the mortgagee
under the BOW. The court further concluded that the provi-
sion in the BOW clearly and plainly stated that the interests
invalidated by any act or neglect of the lessee, mortgagor or owner of
the within-described aircraft nor by any change in the title or owner-
ship of the property; provided, however, that the wrongful conversion,
embezzlement or secretion by purchaser, mortgagor or lessee in posses-
sion under a mortgage, conditional sale or lease agreement of the air-
craft insured is not covered under this policy, unless specifically in-
sured against and premium paid therefor, provided, also, that in case
the lessee, mortgagor or owner shall neglect to pay any premium due
under such policy, the lienholder shall, on demand, pay the same.
Id. at 33-34.
" Id. at 34.
59 American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Young, No. 438983, slip op. at 3 (Minn.
Ramsey County Dist. Ct. Jan. 28, 1982).
60 Id. at 5 (emphasis supplied by the court).
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of the mortgagee" 'shall not be invalidated by any act or neg-
lect' of [the mortgagor] 'except that of conversion, embezzle-
ment or secretion.' "'61 The BOW "savings clause" was held to
be merely a statement of the rules of construction, when the
provisions of the main policy conflict with the BOW.2
The decisions in Lakewood, Security and American Na-
tional Bank appear to be inconsistent. However, a close read-
ing reveals that there is no actual inconsistency. In Lakewood,
the court reached its decision based upon the finding that the
aircraft had been converted. s This position is consistent with
both the main policy and the BOW, because both provide ex-
clusionary language for conversion, embezzlement or secre-
tion. On the other hand, in Security and American National
Bank, the courts did not find a conversion and therefore were
left to consider the applicability of the main policy exclusions
to the BOW." In both Security and American National Bank
the court found that the main policy exclusions conflicted
with the BOW language concerning invalidation of the cover-
age as to the mortgagee by any act or neglect of the
mortgagor. 5
TERRITORIAL LIMITS
Any aircraft insurance policy will always include a section
dealing with or restricting coverage to a specified territorial
area. These limits may be modified or extended by endorse-
ment; however, any loss or occurrence that arises outside the
specified area will be excluded from coverage. This territorial
limitation creates two interesting questions: (1) What falls
within the policy's territorial limits? and (2) Whether a
breach of the policy's territorial limits will void coverage
under the BOW?
In order to void coverage, an insurer must establish that the
Id.
42 Id.
U See supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
" 399 So. 2d at 32; American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Young, No. 438983, slip
op. at 5 (Minn. Ramsey County Dist. Ct. Jan. 28, 1982).
399 So. 2d at 32; American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Young, No. 438983, slip
op. at 5 (Minn. Ramsey County Dist. Ct. Jan. 28, 1982).
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words used in a policy not only may be construed according to
the company's interpretation, but that the interpretation is
the only one that may be fairly placed on those words."
The issue of what effect a policy's territorial limitations
have on coverage under the BOW was addressed in Americas
Aviation v. Marine Insurance Co.,67 a case in which an air-
craft was damaged outside the territorial limits set by the pol-
icy and the mortgagee sought recovery for the loss. 8 The
court found that the policy's territorial limitations were in
conflict with the BOW and therefore the BOW mandated
coverage. 9
CANCELLATION
Most BOW forms require that, in the event the insurer
cancels the policy and gives notice to the mortgagor, he is
likewise obligated to give notice to the mortgagee. 0 When the
insurer is cancelling the policy for nonpayment of the pre-
mium, both the main policy and the BOW require that notice
be given to both the mortgagor and mortgagee. The policy
should specify what type of cancellation notice may be given.
In the event the insurer gives notice of a potential future can-
cellation to the mortgagee, if the premium has not been paid,
such notice may be insufficient to cancel the mortgagee's cov-
erage under the BOW. The key to cancellation treatment is
Vargas v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 16 Av. Cas. 17,508 (2d Cir. 1981); ANDERSON, supra
note 2, § 37:1476.
67 229 So. 2d 314 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
" Id. at 316.
6* Id. It is apparent, for example, that in Security Ins. Co. of Hartford, 339 So. 2d
31 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981), the Colombian detention was outside the territorial
limits of the policy, although this issue was not addressed by the Florida court. The
court's silence and its ultimate decision indicate that the court found the territorial
limitations provisions of the underlying policy inapplicable for purposes of voiding
coverage as to the mortgagee.
It is my opinion that the courts in Lakewood Bank and Trust Co., 1982 FIRE &
CASUALTY CAS. 414 (CCH) (N.D. Tex. 1981) and General Electric Credit Corp., 16 Av.
Cas. 17,743 (N.D. Tex 1980) were confronted with the applicability of territorial limi-
tations to coverage under the BOW. However, neither court directly addressed this
issue.
7' See supra notes 10, 17 and accompanying text.
BREACH OF WARRANTY
the existence of two separate insurance policies." Cancellation
of one does not necessarily cancel the other. Specific written
notice of the BOW cancellation should be given if that is what
is intended. Otherwise the BOW coverage may survive cancel-
lation of the underlying policy.
Another issue, while not addressed by any court, is the ef-
fect of cancellation of the underlying policy by the mortgagor.
Does this likewise cancel the BOW, and if it does, should the
mortgagee receive notice of cancellation? As a general rule,
when a mortgagor cancels his insurance policy, the insurer
treats this as a cancellation of the BOW. The aviation manag-
ers and underwriting insurance company involved, however,
may or may not give notice of that cancellation to the mortga-
gee. Because the mortgagor and mortgagee theoretically have
separate policies of insurance, reliance upon the mortgagor's
cancellation for purposes of cancelling the BOW, particularly
where notice is not provided to the mortgagee, involves signif-
icant risk. Regardless of what the policy may say about notice,
the insurer is taking a chance by failing to give notice to the
mortgagee.
WHEN Is THERE A "Loss" UNDER THE BOW?
Another troublesome area is the determination of when a
"loss" occurs under the BOW, because the BOW does not de-
fine "loss". Consequently, it is necessary to interpret the gray
area between two policies, the main policy and the BOW, to
find a definition. Under the main policy, "loss" is discussed in
the insuring agreement and in that context it occurs when
there is a "direct physical loss or direct physical damage." 7'
The term, however, is not defined within the definitional sec-
tion of the main policy, nor is it fully explained in the policy
conditions.
This problem is compounded in the BOW because "loss" is
7' American Mercury Ins. Co. v. Inland-Western Fire Ins. Co., 6 Ariz. App. 409, 433
P.2d 60 (1967); Employers Fire Ins. Co. v. Pennsylvania Millers Mutual Ins. Co., 116
Ga. App. 433, 157 S.E.2d 807 (1967); 11 APPLEMAN supra note 2, § 3401.
72 See supra notes 6, 10 and accompanying text.
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not defined and it is used singularly, without clarification.78
The lack of a definition of "loss" in the BOW makes it unclear
as to whether there must be a direct physical loss under the
BOW for the mortgagee to recover. Another problem area re-
sults from the fact that the BOW limits the amount payable
to the mortgagee to the amounts remaining due after the
mortgagee "has used all reasonable means to collect amounts
due" from the mortgagor. 4 Consequently, the parties are left
to determine what "all reasonable means to collect" actually
requires, what losses may be covered, and when that loss has
occurred.
The policies arguably indicate that the mortgagee does not
have a "loss" until such time as: (1) coverage has been suc-
cessfully denied to the mortgagor; (2) the mortgagee has taken
possession of the aircraft and sold same; (3) the mortgagee has
applied the sale proceeds to the debt; and (4) the mortgagee
has pursued the mortgagor for any sums remaining due. When
all four criteria have been met the mortgagee has established
a direct measurable loss. From the mortgagee's point of view,
however, a "loss" has been sustained when: (1) there is a de-
fault under its contract with the mortgagor; (2) the aircraft
value is less than the amount due under the contract; and (3)
the mortgagor has failed to satisfy its obligation in full.
While policy language problems add to the confusion sur-
rounding what constitutes a loss under the BOW, there are
administrative and philosophical differences as to what consti-
tutes a "loss" and what may constitute "reasonable means to
collect" on the part of the mortgagee. To resolve these differ-
ences, the courts may be required to weigh the respective obli-
gations of the parties involved. While there are not any cases
directly on point, two cases appear to hold that the mortgagee
need not sustain a direct measurable loss to recover under the
BOW.
In Cessna Finance Corporation v. Ranger Insurance Co.,75
it was held that the mortgagee does not have to repossess and
" Id.
74 Id.
16 15 Av. Cas. 17,309 (D. Kan. 1979).
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deliver possession of an aircraft to the insurer as a condition
to payment under the BOW.7 ' While there was never a ques-
tion as to whether the aircraft was "physically damaged," the
court, by not requiring a repossession to sustain recovery
under the BOW, implies that the mortgagee under the BOW
does not have to incur a direct measurable loss. The impair-
ment of the mortgagee's position may be sufficient to establish
a recovery.
In Security Insurance Co. v. Commercial Credit Equip-
ment7 the court, noting that the BOW uses the term "loss"
not "direct physical loss," concluded that "[wihen a policy
provision remains undefined, common everyday usage deter-
mines its meaning. 76 Consequently, the court found no re-
quirement under the BOW that there be a direct physical loss,
and the confiscation of the aircraft was a loss covered under
the BOW.79
MANUFACTURER FINANCING AND THE BOW
What happens when a manufacturer provides financing for
an aircraft and is named in a loss payable clause or BOW?
Does this have any impact upon a loss that may be the result
of a product defect, and if so, what, if any, right of subroga-
tion may the insurer have as against the manufacturer?
This issue was decided in Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp.80 In Allegheny, the airline (Allegheny) pur-
chased an aircraft which was financed by General Motors
(GM). s1 The Allegheny policy contained a BOW in favor of
GM.8 2 The aircraft crashed and was destroyed, allegedly as a
result of GM's negligent design and manufacture. The insurer
paid the claim and thereafter, through the policy subrogation
provisions, attempted to recover against GM. 8 The court
76 Id.
7 399 So. 2d 31 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
78 Id. at 34.
"Id.
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found that GM was a named insured under the policy and the
insurer was barred from recovery."'
Textron, Inc., through its Bell Helicopter Division, has like-
wise been successful in having product coverage extended to
situations in which they are named on the mortgagor's insur-
ance policy and have manufactured, sold and financed the he-
licopter.85 The concept was extended to include lease situa-
tions in BOW Helicopters, Ltd. v. Avco Lycoming Engine
Group, Stratford Division." The main rationale for the exten-
sion of coverage is that the insurer is precluded from recover-
ing from its own insureds for the losses it insures against.
While this appears to be harsh, because the insurer probably
had no present intent to assume product coverage, the manu-
facturer's argument and position is simple: it is the "insured"
under the insurance policy.
The good news is that not all aircraft manufacturers sell di-
rect or directly finance aircraft purchases. The bad news is
that many of the heavy iron manufacturers do sell direct and
finance. The specific entity providing the financing, however,
may be a subsidiary of the manufacturer. Consequently, the
insurer may not be providing product coverage, because the
entity providing the financing is different from the manufac-
turer and, as a result, the manufacturer itself may not be a
"named insured". In any event, the insurer is unquestionably
going to have a great deal of difficulty in denying product cov-
erage where the manufacturer is the named insured in the
BOW and directly sells and finances the product.
SUBROGATION
The BOW presents some rather unique subrogation
problems. All of the various policy forms provide for subroga-
6 Id. at 17,392.
See, e.g., Croman Corp. v. Textron, Inc., No. 78-396, slip op. (D. Or. May 20,
1980) (order denying defendant's motion for partial summary judgment); Corvallis
Aero Service, Inc. v. Textron, Inc., No. 80-6249-E, slip op. (D. Or. April, 22, 1981)
(order granting defendant's motion for partial summary judgment); BOW Helicop-
ters, Ltd. v. Avco Lycoming Engine Group, Stratford Division, slip op. (Alta. Ct. App.
June 15, 1981) (order dismissing appeal).
" No. 978 C.A. Alberta.
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tion and, in some instances, for an assignment of the mortga-
gee's rights as against the mortgagor. When the insurer pays
the mortgagee for a loss under the BOW and that amount is
less than the total indebtedness, in order for the insurer to be
allowed subrogation to the mortgagee's rights, the insurer
must prove that its obligation to the mortgagor was void.
Merely establishing that recovery under the underlying policy
was suspended by the mortgagor, or that the mortgagor ob-
tained additional insurance, is not sufficient.87
The court, in MFA Mutual Insurance Co. v. Huddleston,"
found that the acquisition of additional insurance by the
mortgagor did not increase the possibility of hazards. There-
fore, the contemplation of the parties and payment by the in-
surer under the BOW was simply a discharge of the insurer's
obligation to the mortgagee. The policy was not actually
"voided" but merely suspended due to a technicality.8 When
the insurer does make a payment to the mortgagee pursuant
to the BOW, the insurer's right of subrogation is based upon
the insurance contract itself and any ambiguity in the lan-
guage of the policy should be construed and interpreted
against the insurer.9 Moreover, most courts have found that
the subrogation provision of the BOW does not impair the
mortgagee's rights to collect all of his remaining debt. The in-
terests of the insurer in this instance are subrogated to those
of the mortgagee, because it is only a fortuitous circumstance
that relieves the insurer of an absolute liability, and there is
no reason, absent specific language, to further benefit the in-
surer.' The insurance proceeds paid to the mortgagee pursu-
ant to the BOW will not operate to reduce or extinguish the
mortgage debt or to discharge the mortgage, but only operate
87 MFA Mutual Ins. Co. v. Huddleston, 459 S.W.2d 104 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970).
459 S.W.2d 104 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970).
"8 Id. at 108.
" Lervold v. Republic Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 142 Kan. 43, 45 P.2d 839 (1935).
I d. at 49, 45 P.2d at 843. See Nat'l Bank of Or. v. American Home Assurance
Co., 347 F. Supp. 311 (D. Or. 1972); Savings Bank v. Schancupp, 108 Conn. 588, 144
A. 36 (1928); Quincy Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Jones, 486 S.W. 2d 126 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1972, no writ); National Ben Franklin Ins. Co. v. Praetorians, 67 S.W.2d
333 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1934, writ ref'd).
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to satisfy, pro tanto, the mortgagee's claim. The mortgage is
left in full force against the mortgagor, with no right on the
mortgagor's part to claim a reduction in the debt as a result of
the insurer's payment to the mortgagee." Cases have held
that the insurer may gain additional rights in the event he
pays the mortgagee in full. The insurer takes a full assignment
of the rights of the mortgagee, and the insurer gets the right
to demand payment of the mortgage and the right to foreclose
if the debt remains unpaid. 8
The issue of subrogation, with regard to the aircraft BOW,
is complicated further by the fact that the BOW itself seems
to make no provision for a partial loss. It provides for pay-
ment on a stated value basis with the insurer obtaining a full
assignment." The provisions dealing with a partial loss are
found within the underlying policy conditions and the appli-
cable policy definitions. It seems clear, therefore, that because
the BOW specifically addresses the issue of payment of a loss,
any loss should be paid in accordance with the provisions of
the BOW. To treat the payment any other way would be to
give to the insurer the benefit of construing an ambiguity in
the policy in its favor.
As a practical matter, this problem may not be significant
because most mortgagees are simply interested in being made
whole. Consequently, they may be willing to recover for a loss
on a partial basis. In the event of partial payment, however,
there will be an inherent problem with regard to the insurer's
rights of subrogation and to any potential assignment. When
an insurer voluntarily makes a payment outside the BOW's
specific terms, it is my opinion that the insurer is not entitled
to any benefits that the mortgagee may have as against the
mortgagor.9 5
92 Savings Bank v. Schancupp, 108 Conn. 588, 144 A. 36 (1928); Quincy Mut. Fire
Ins. Co. v. Jones, 486 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972, no writ).
93 National Ben Franklin Ins. Co. v. Praetorians, 67 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1934, writ ref'd).
" See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
This position, I feel, is consistent with the Lervold, Savings Bank and National




Because of the highly mobile. nature of aircraft and the
unique requirements of airworthiness certification, as well as
pilot licensing, the aircraft BOW is more complex than the
BOW found in a standard fire insurance policy. As many of
the cases illustrate, the direct relationship of the aircraft
BOW to the underlying policy terms and conditions is not al-
ways clear. This uncertainty makes it difficult to predict with
any degree of accuracy what acts or neglect by the mortgagor
may give rise to coverage for the mortgagee under the BOW.
Without question, the BOW is ripe for litigation. The over-
all problem is compounded by: (1) inherent differences in the
interests of the insurer and the mortgagee; (2) the basic un-
derwriting intent and the fact that it is not clearly and specifi-
cally encompased within the BOW; (3) the lack of uniformity
in the more than twenty different forms of the BOW; (4) the
issuance of some BOW's by direct writers, some by aviation
managers, and some by lending institutions; (5) the fact that
many BOW forms are produced by assembling and grafting
various policy phrases and clauses together; and (6) the inher-
ent difficulty in determining what the exact relationship may
be between the main policy and the BOW.
All of these problem areas may eventually be resolved
through litigation. Litigation, however, is an unnecessary and
costly resolution to the problem, even if only legal fees are
considered. The better approach would be to draft a BOW
with clear and concise policy language. While this is an easy
statement to make, the problems of accomplishing the task
without changing the manner in which we look at the BOW
itself are numerous. Whether a clarification of the relationship
between the main policy and the BOW is attempted or the
BOW is made truly a separate policy, the drafter will have to
put all his legal faculties to work.
A clear and concise BOW will not be accomplished unless
there is some cooperation between the insurers and lenders,
both of whom have substantial interests to protect, and both
of whom have different philosophical understandings of the
BOW. The insurer believes that the BOW cannot extend cov-
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erage where there was NO coverage under the main policy, in
the first instance. The mortgagee, on the other hand, believes
that the BOW extends coverage where the main policy may be
voided by any act of the mortgagor. If cooperation can be
achieved, however, it will enable all parties involved to under-
stand the coverage extended and, further, it should provide
the insurer with a better mechanism for rating the coverage
and risks involved. It will also give an opportunity to the
mortgagor to protect his interests in some other fashion, if
that is necessary.
